Kelsie Nabben’s Academic Research Library
Dr Kelsie Nabben is an ethnographic researcher specialising in the social impacts of emerging technologies, particularly decentralised digital infrastructure (including blockchains, peer-to-peer protocols, and Decentralised Autonomous Organisations) and other algorithmic systems (such as Large-Language-Models). Her interdisciplinary research involves analysis of the interplay between social and technical elements of digital infrastructure with a focus on resilience and accountability in contexts of digital governance. Practically, she has published and conducted industry projects on COVID-19 digital responses, software system vulnerability mapping methods, cybernetics and digital-physical systems, and the governance of algorothmic systems.
Dr. Nabben completed her PhD as a scholarship recipient at RMIT University’s Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making & Society on the topic of resilience in decentralised technologies, and was awarded an RMIT Vice Chancellor’s HDR Prize for Research Engagement and Impact. During this time, Dr. Nabben also worked as Researcher in the RMIT Blockchain Innovation Hub. She is currently a Max Weber Fellow at European University Institute with Dr Primavera De Filippi and BlockchainGov, focusing on accountability in blockchain systems as a context of digital private ordering and self-governance.
Nabben’s research has been applied in various settings, including contributions to an Australian Federal blockchain working group and the development of international policy toolkits on ‘Decentralised Autonomous Organisations’ for the World Economic Forum. Additionally, she works on industry projects with engineering firm BlockScience and frequently shares her perspectives through peer-reviewed publications, national news, and radio.
Most of her research is open access, including blogs at: https://kelsienabben.substack.com/ or https://medium.com/@kelsie.nabben
European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Max Weber Fellow
BlockchainGov, Postdoctoral Researcher
BlockScience, Senior Researcher, Digital Ethnography
RMIT University, School of Media and Communication, Adjunct Fellow
RMIT University, Digital Ethnography Research Centre
RMIT University, Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making & Society (ADM+S), Higher Degree by Research Alumni
RMIT University, Blockchain Innovation Hub, Alumni
Metagov, Contributor
Decentralization Research Centre, Research Fellow
Twitter: @kelsiemvn
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/kelsien/
Subtack: https://substack.com/profile/1619235-kelsie-nabben
Medium:https://kelsienabben.medium.com/ ; https://medium.com/@blockscience
Mirror: https://kelsiemvn.mirror.xyz/
Google Scholar: https://scholar-google-com.ezproxy.lib.rmit.edu.au/citations?user=vsPDnMIAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao
Academia edu: https://rmit.academia.edu/KelsieNabben
SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=4117892
Orchid ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4684-4113
Nabben, K. & De Filippi, P. (2024). Accountability protocols? On-chain dynamics in blockchain governance. Internet Policy Review, 13(4). https://doi.org/10.14763/2024.4.1807. Abstract: Accountability refers to a relationship of responsibility, answerability, and enforceability between individuals and groups. In contrast to traditional institutions that rely on enforcement of accountability through traditional legal frameworks, blockchain systems rely on the “rule of code”, i.e. the operation, governance, and transactions on a blockchain are governed by pre-written, transparent, and immutable rules that are expressed in software code. By empirically examining the case of the Ethereum blockchain and the Lido “liquid” staking services protocol, this paper analyses the formalisation of accountability mechanisms between protocols to ensure that Lido’s proportionate share of staked ETH on the network does not pose a risk to the security and stability of Ethereum. The findings of this paper are threefold: (1) accountability on a blockchain is achieved through the implementation of checks and balances institutionalised via technological protocols (“on-chain accountability”); (2) accountability requires trade-offs, meaning that giving accountability to one type of stakeholders might actually reduce the accountability of the system for another category of stakeholder; and (3) end users of the blockchain are consumers of accountability, rather than influential participants in producing it. This research underscores the complex interplay of technical and governance considerations in ensuring accountability within blockchain systems, offering insights into the broader implications of on-chain accountability for stakeholders across blockchain ecosystems.
Nabben, K. (2024). Entering the Field of Web3: “Infrastructuring” and How to Do it. In Q. DuPont, D. Kavanagh, & P. Dylan-Ennis (Eds.), Defining Web3: A Guide to the New Cultural Economy (Vol. 89, pp. 27–42). Emerald Publishing Limited. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0733-558X20240000089003.
Abstract: “Web3” is a practice in participatory digital infrastructures through the ability to read, write, and control own digital assets. Web3 is hailed as the alternative to the failings of big tech, offering a participatory mode of digital organization and shared ownership of digital infrastructure through algorithmic governance. This paper offers an introductory playbook to researchers entering the field of Web3 by providing an analytical lens to approach the emergent field of Web3 as “infrastructuring.” It argues that Web3 can be understood as a collective, community exploration of “how to infrastructure.” Drawing on qualitative examples derived from digital ethnographic methods, the study reveals that play, politics, and prefiguration are fundamental qualities underpinning Web3’s vision of offering an “exit” from established institutional infrastructures. Therefore, a primary challenge Web3 faces in its governance experiments centers around the question of how to effectively build and manage infrastructure.
Nabben, K. (2024). “DAO Vulnerability Mapping: A Theoretical and Empirical Tool”. In Decentralized Autonomous Organizations by Kerckhoven, S.V. and Chohan, U.W. (Eds.). (Routledge: London). ISBN: 9781003449607.
Abstract: Blockchain technology is not just about digital currencies but even more about group coordination via software. Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) are a broad organizational form for decentralized, blockchain-based coordination towards shared objectives. The concept of DAOs is driven by an ideology of self-governance through technological infrastructure. Drawing on the Science & Technology Studies conception of “vulnerability,” this chapter offers an analytical approach to identifying DAO vulnerabilities across multiple dimensions termed “DAO Vulnerability Mapping.” Vulnerability mapping is not only for analytical purposes but also to identify, prioritize, and address vulnerabilities towards improving resilience. DAO vulnerabilities can occur along social, technical, legal, economic, and environmental dimensions, and can emerge from inside a DAO (endogenously), or from outside a DAO (exogenously). This approach is pertinent in socio-technical contexts, such as blockchain-based organization, where social and technical dynamics are inextricably linked. In this chapter, these multidisciplinary dimensions of DAO vulnerabilities are explored in practice via a qualitative case study of a “liquid staking” DAO called Lido DAO. DAO vulnerability mapping is both a conceptual analytical tool and a methodological approach for studying and understanding digitally mediated organizations, as well as the novel practices of those engaging in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations.
Zargham, M., & Nabben, K. (2023). Aligning ‘Decentralized Autonomous Organization’ to Precedents in Cybernetics. MIT Computational Law Report. Available at: https://law.mit.edu/pub/dao-precedents-cybernetics.
Abstract: The concept of “Decentralized Autonomous Organization” has been popularized as part of the “Web 3.0” movement. This movement is characterized by digital infrastructures that are ‘decentralized’ in network architecture and permissionless to use. Decentralized autonomous organizations, referred to as DAOs, are a digital expression of the political will to self-organize. The granular entanglement of social and technical concepts makes it challenging to identify a historical precedent for DAOs. Yet, literature review and analysis reveals that this particular entanglement of information systems and self-organization is consistent with longstanding conceptual development and practice in the field of cybernetics. Drawing on Stafford Beer’s Viable Systems Model, this piece bridges DAOs and cybernetics via two main principles of organization: viability and purpose. Viability is a property of a system such that it has sufficient adaptive capacity to thrive in the face of change; adaptive capacity is characterized according to Ross Ashby’s concept of ‘variety’. Purpose is the ability to define and collectively pursue a goal in the sense of feedback control systems. Building on the control theoretic concepts of observability, controllability, and reachability, we examine the ‘governance surface’ of an organization and the associated trade-offs between resilience and robustness that emerge in governance surface design. We propose that this trade-off can be addressed with a constitutional archetype whereby an organization’s ability to update its code is constrained but not eliminated. A case study from a DAO known as ‘1Hive’ is explored to demonstrate this archetype in action. We consider the limitations of the cybernetics perspective by emphasizing the subjectivity of the governance designer. Finally, we conclude with future research directions.
Nabben, K. “Cryptoeconomics as Governance: An Intellectual History from ‘Crypto Anarchy’ to ‘Cryptoeconomics.’” Internet Histories 0, no. 0 (March 3, 2023): 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2023.2183643.
Abstract: Existing scholarship on cryptoeconomics describes this field as a new and emergent phenomenon. In this paper, I claim that crypto anarchists and cryptoeconomists design and build decentralised networks as governance systems according to the common principles of cryptography, economics, and engineering, and thus, cryptoeconomics is not new but has historical intellectual roots in the political ideology of Crypto Anarchy. Cryptoeconomics is a multidisciplinary field of study concerned with the design of decentralised systems that facilitate the coordination of multiple actors. Practitioners of crypteoconomics, known as “cryptoeconomists,” employ engineering and economic methods to create institutional infrastructure for social coordination. Crypto Anarchy is a political ideology that emphasises autonomy and anonymity and the practice of self-organising through technical means largely attributed to a counter-cultural subgroup known as the “cypherpunks”. I demonstrate the link between Crypto Anarchy and cryptoeconomics through the analysis of empirical evidence from primary archival sources, secondary sources, and academic literature. The implication of these findings is a deeper understanding of what the creation of cryptoeconomic systems does in enabling a political economy of distributed, autonomous coordination. What cryptoeconomists did not adopt and perpetuate is a value for anonymity, which is where the social outcomes of Crypto Anarchy and cryptoeconomics diverge.
Nabben, K. (2023). Web3 as ‘self-infrastructuring’: The challenge is how. Big Data & Society, 10(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/20539517231159002.
Abstract: The term ‘Web3’ refers to the practices of participating in digital infrastructures through the ability to read, write and coordinate digital assets. Web3 is hailed as an alternative to the failings of big tech, offering a participatory mode of digital self-organizing and shared ownership of digital infrastructure through software-encoded governance rules and participatory practices. Yet, very few analytical frameworks have been presented in academic literature by which to approach Web3. This piece draws on the theoretical lens of infrastructure studies to offer an analytical framework to approach the emergent field of Web3 as an exploration in ‘how to infrastructure’ through prefigurative self-infrastructuring. Drawing on qualitative examples from digital ethnographic methods, I demonstrate how the origins of Web3 reveal the intentions of its creators as a political tool of prefiguration, yet its practices reveal the inherent tension of expressing these ideals in coherent technical and institutional infrastructure. Thus, I argue that one of the fundamental challenges Web3 is negotiating through technical and governance experiments is ‘how to self-infrastructure?’.
Nabben, K. “Governance by Algorithms, Governance of Algorithms: Human-Machine Politics in Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs).” PuntOorg International Journal 8, no. 1 (2023): 36–54. https://doi.org/10.19245/25.05.pij.8.1.3.
Abstract: This paper situates Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs) in organisational theory as an expression of ‘organising outside organisations’ through algorithmic governance. Digital networks, such as the internet, make organising outside of traditional organisational structures possible (Shirky, 2008). DAOs are an attempt at decentralised organisation towards independence from external political influence. DAOs aim for self-governance using algorithms grounded in public blockchain technology, ‘smart’ contracts, and public key cryptography in complement to the traditional rule of law to enforce behaviours. As a relatively recent phenomenon, DAOs remain under-theorised in the field of organisational studies. This paper locates DAOs as organisations in relation to the ‘organisational elements’ proposed by Ahrne and Brunsson (2011) to respond to the research question, ‘can algorithms, as a centralising process, be governed in a decentralised manner?’. I employ qualitative, digital ethnographic methods to trace the relations between human and non-human actors in decentralised networks to investigate algorithmic governance in the case of a DAO called “Gitcoin”. DAO constituents are engaged in both the governance of algorithms, and governance by algorithms. I argue that algorithmic governance in DAOs constitutes a novel form of ‘machine politics’ that elevates algorithms to the position of new political actors who shape and determine how humans behave as well as organisational outcomes, while simultaneously needing to draw on the organisational structure to govern them. This piece contributes to a research agenda on the social implications of algorithmic governance and decentralised modes of organising.
Nabben, K., and Zargham, M. (2022). “The Ethnography of a ‘Decentralized Autonomous Organization’ (DAO): De-mystifying algorithmic systems”. EPIC Conference Proceedings, ‘Resilience, 2022’. https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/epic.12104
Abstract: This paper details ethnographic methods, experiences, and insights from an ethnographer and an industry engaged complex systems engineer in how to study resilience in blockchain-based DAOs as a novel field site. Amidst digitization of numerous elements of government, work, and everyday life, ‘Decentralized Autonomous Organizations’ (DAOs) provide a field site for the generation of ethnographic insights into opportunities and limitations in organizational resilience in human-machine assemblages. As a broad organizational form, DAOs aim to enable people to coordinate and govern themselves through automated rules deployed on a public blockchain (Hassan & Di Filippi, 2021). DAOs are an experiment in ‘computer aided governance’. These adaptive, socio-technical infrastructures are envisioned as capable of restructuring the foundations of governance in human societies (Merkle, 2016; Kolestsi, 2019; Garrod, 2016). Ethnography provides a qualitative tool to elicit the social dynamics of governance, adaptability, and resilience in a context of algorithmic governance and automation. By foregrounding the social dynamics of organizational adaptability and resilience, our resilience framework and vulnerabilities mapping tools help us to operationalize complex domains to de-mystify and re-humanize algorithmic systems.
Nabben, K. “Blockchain Security as People Security” (chapter) in Principles and Practice of Blockchains (Springer). https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-10507-4.
Abstract: The notion that blockchains offer decentralized, “trustless” guarantees of security through technology is a fundamental misconception held by many advocates. This misconception hampers participants from understanding the security differences between public and private blockchains and adopting blockchain technology in suitable contexts. This chapter introduces the notion of “people security” to argue that blockchains hold inherent limitations in offering accurate security guarantees to people as participants in blockchain-based infrastructure, due to the differing nature of the threats to participants reliant on blockchain as secure digital infrastructure, as well as the technical limitations between different types of blockchain architecture. This chapter applies a sociotechnical security framework to assess the social, software, and infrastructural layers of blockchain applications to reconceptualize “blockchain security” as “people security.” A sociotechnical security analysis of existing macrosocial-level blockchain systems surfaces discrepancies between the social, technical, and infrastructural layers of a blockchain network, the technical and governance decisions that characterize the network, and the expectations of, and threats to, participants using the network. The results identify a number of security and trust assumptions against various blockchain architectures, participants, and applications. Findings indicate that private blockchains have serious limitations for securing the interests of users in macrosocial contexts due to their centralized nature. In contrast, public blockchains reveal trust and security shortcomings at the micro- and meso-organizational levels, yet there is a lack of suitable desktop case studies by which to analyze sociotechnical security at the macrosocial level. The theoretical basis of this piece provides a foundation for blockchain security promises to be further investigated in practice and addressed in order for blockchain security to more accurately provide “people security” for those that use it.
Nabben, K. “Decentralized Technology in Practice: Social and technical resilience in IPFS,” 2022 IEEE 42nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops (ICDCSW), Bologna, Italy, 2022, pp. 66-72, Doi:10.1109/ICDCSW56584.2022.00021. (https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9951370/)
Abstract: The “Interplanetary File System” (IPFS) refers to a peer-to-peer content addressing protocol that is designed to be “upgradeable, resilient, and more open”. In conjunction with “Filecoin”, a blockchain-based data storage marketplace, the aim of this technology is to offer people digital infrastructure that decentralized from central, corporate control, to store and manage their data. This paper investigates socio-technical resilience as adaptability and transformability under threat for participants in IPFS in practice as a peer-to-peer digital infrastructure. I find that developer conceptions of “resilience” in this system relate to adaptability of the network against isolation or split. Yet, resilience for those using IPFS relates to data integrity, in line with the preferences and local context of the provider of that data. I employ qualitative research methods to investigate why and how people use the network, and in what ways it meets the needs of their contexts and purposes, or in some cases, falls short. I find that while significant emphasis is placed on the technical resilience of this infrastructure, these tools remain logically fractured at the social coordination layer that guides processes of data ownership, governance, and storage, and this limits the resilience of the network to serve people’s needs in their local context. I then propose examples of institutional infrastructural frameworks that could provide participatory data governance patterns to help people collectively organize their use of decentralized digital infrastructure for greater resilience in IPFS and Filecoin. Finally, I outline further research directions to improve resilience in decentralized data storage infrastructure.
Nabben, K. (2022) “Decentralized Governance Patterns: A Study of “Friends With Benefits” DAO”. Interfaces. Vol. 3. Available online: https://cse.umn.edu/cbi/interfaces.
Abstract: Blockchain communities are actively exploring governance models to facilitate new, decentralized organizational forms. This essay investigates if the Internet governance principles of multistakeholderism can support more legitimate stakeholder inclusion and decentralized governance in blockchain-based Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs). “Friends With Benefits” (FWB) is a ‘social DAO’ with a mission to help cultural creators gain agency over their production through Web3 tools. Yet, FWB’s mission is paradoxical to its own Venture Capital backed funding model and governance processes, highlighting the challenges of decentralized governance and the need for multistakeholderism and innovation.
Rennie, E., Zargham, M., Tan, J., Miller, L., Abbott, J., Nabben, K. and De Filippi, P., (2022). “Toward a Participatory Digital Ethnography of Blockchain Governance”. Qualitative Inquiry, https://doi.org/10.1177/10778004221097056.
Abstract: Blockchain governance occurs through a combination of social and technical activities, involving smart contracts, deliberation within a group, and voting. These processes are significant as they demonstrate how governance of distributed infrastructures is evolving. While typologies of blockchain governance can be constructed by gathering on-chain interactions and formal rules, other aspects are more difficult to observe, including governance interactions occurring inside discussion forums. In this article, we discuss a participatory digital ethnography technique, whereby participants and researchers use a bespoke bot to identify governance interactions occurring within project forums (on Discord). The technique is designed to be used in conjunction with the analysis of software for the purpose of mapping and understanding the “governance surface” of different protocols. We describe our tools and methods for understanding automated futures through a case study of the SourceCred community, an organization using, developing, and maintaining open source software called SourceCred. The SourceCred codebase is also used by other decentralized communities for various organizational functions, including reputation and compensation.
Nabben, K. (2022). “Decentralising Data Governance: Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs) as Data Trusts. (Working Paper). https://apo.org.au/node/318350.
Abstract: This paper explores the idea that Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs) are a new type of data trust for decentralised governance of data.The key contributions of this paper are: an investigation of how the concept of data trusts applies to DAOs, an examination of if and how DAOs as data trusts may provide greater accountability and recourse over data stewardship for participants through software-encoded governance, rather than traditional legal recourse, and an exploration of examples and possibilities of DAOs as data trusts emerging in decentralised blockchain communities.
Nabben, K. & Rennie, E. (2022). “Ad hoc network”. Internet Policy Review, 11(2). https://doi.org/10.14763/2022.2.1666.
Abstract: There is no one set definition for the phrase “ad hoc networks”. The term refers to the ability for members of a network to establish a network connection between devices. Ad hoc networks are relevant both in technical terms of certain network infrastructures, as well as in terms of the social, political and economic modes of self-organisation they enable. This requires people to combine software and hardware tools to set up peer-to-peer infrastructure that provides access to temporary information networks, as well as networking standards and policy frameworks. When long-standing, these can adapt to become local area networks. An example of an ad hoc network is a temporary cryptocurrency economy, such as a Decentralised Autonomous Organisation, which can connect people, information, and resources online and in person for a specific purpose.
Nabben, K. & Zargham, M. (2022). “Permissionlessness”. Internet Policy Review, 11(2). https://doi.org/10.14763/2022.2.1656.
Abstract: “Permissionlessness” is a term often used in association with public blockchains. In this glossary entry, we explore the origins, evolution, and coexisting uses and meanings of the term “permissionless” to contextualise it. We argue that a technosocial system is deemed permissionless if it is possible to participate in the use, development, and governance of that system or infrastructure without requiring permission from an authority, by adhering to publicly stated procedures. This term is much more broadly applicable then just blockchain systems although it is relevant to decentralized systems. It can be conceptualised as a technical attribute, an ideology, and a cultural value, and links to the access, control, governance, entry and exit of an open information system.
Nabben, K. (2021). Is a “Decentralized Autonomous Organization” a Panopticon? Algorithmic governance as creating and mitigating vulnerabilities in DAOs. In Proceedings of the Interdisciplinary Workshop on (de) Centralization in the Internet (IWCI’21). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 18–25. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3488663.3493791.
**Abstract: ** This piece explores algorithmic governance as a strength and a vulnerability in the experience of building participatory communities known as “Decentralized Autonomous Organizations”. The Cypherpunks were terrified of surveillance. They envisaged the combination of cryptography and computer technology fundamentally altering the nature of trust and reputation and built cryptographically secure blockchain-based infrastructure to counter this threat. Now, not just on chain transactions are being tracked but every move of participants in blockchain communities. Reputation in blockchain systems could become the new algorithmic authoritarianism if mis-used for social control. This piece analyzes the ways in which decentralization efforts can be a threat to themselves by exploring the question, ‘Are “Decentralized Autonomous Organizations” (DAOs) the next panopticon of algorithmic governance or a different panacea, and what does this mean for human autonomy in “autonomous” systems?’. By employing ethnographic methods and case study analysis, this piece provides an important qualitative contribution to the early dynamics of the aspirations and problems of decentralized, autonomous organizations.
Nabben, K. (2021). Blockchain security as “people security”: Applying sociotechnical security to blockchain technology. Frontiers in Computer Science, 62. https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomp.2020.599406.
Abstract: The notion that blockchains offer decentralized, “trustless” guarantees of security through technology is a fundamental misconception held by many advocates. This misconception hampers participants from understanding the security differences between public and private blockchains and adopting blockchain technology in suitable contexts. This paper introduces the notion of “people security” to argue that blockchains hold inherent limitations in offering accurate security guarantees to people as participants in blockchain-based infrastructure, due to the differing nature of the threats to participants reliant on blockchain as secure digital infrastructure, as well as the technical limitations between different types of blockchain architecture. This paper applies a sociotechnical security framework to assess the social, software, and infrastructural layers of blockchain applications to reconceptualize “blockchain security” as “people security.” A sociotechnical security analysis of existing macrosocial level blockchain systems surfaces discrepancies between the social, technical, and infrastructural layers of a blockchain network, the technical and governance decisions that characterize the network, and the expectations of, and threats to, participants using the network. The results identify a number of security and trust assumptions against various blockchain architectures, participants, and applications. Findings indicate that private blockchains have serious limitations for securing the interests of users in macrosocial contexts, due to their centralized nature. In contrast, public blockchains reveal trust and security shortcomings at the micro and meso-organizational levels, yet there is a lack of suitable desktop case studies by which to analyze sociotechnical security at the macrosocial level. These assumptions need to be further investigated and addressed in order for blockchain security to more accurately provide “people security”.
Nabben, K., Gardner-Stephen, P. and Poblet, M. (2020). “Identifying and Mitigating Humanitarian Challenges to COVID-19 Contact Tracing”. In 2020 IEEE Global Humanitarian Technology Conference (GHTC) (pp. 1-8). IEEE. doi: 10.1109/GHTC46280.2020.9342852.
Abstract: COVID-19 contact tracing has rapidly emerged as a dynamic field of endeavor, with different countries taking different approaches, both politically and technologically. In this paper we examine the situation in Australia’s development of a COVID- 19 contact tracing application as a case-study. Both technological and societal elements are considered, in particular, the ability of poor protection, or the perception of poor protection of privacy and civil liberties to negatively impact the adoption of such an application, and thus scupper its potential. The remainder of the paper explores this digital-politic nexus and tension, and examines how the trade-off can be improved through increasing public acceptance of such technologies through improving their actual and perceived privacy and human rights properties, without reducing their medical effectiveness. Lessons for humanitarian organizations are extracted from this.
Nabben, K. and Gardner-Stephen, P. (2020). “S4: Simple, Secure, Survivable Systems Human-first crisis technology design principles”. In 2020 IEEE Global Humanitarian Technology Conference (GHTC) (pp. 1-7). IEEE. doi: 10.1109/GHTC46280.2020.9342856.
Abstract: nformation technology has become embedded in almost every area of modern life. The many complex digital systems that support modern societies are now highly dependent on the correct function of complex and highly interdependent technological systems. Digital tools are increasingly becoming part of traditional crisis response efforts by government and non- government organisations. While digital tools have substantial capabilities to enhance crisis response efforts, they also pose significant risks to user communities when deployed in time- sensitive, vulnerable and fragile crisis contexts – as part of an already complex system. These risks and inefficiencies have been demonstrated in the contact-tracing application debate in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Technology must be intentionally designed and implemented, both to help solve the problem at hand and support end user communities. The principles of simple, secure and survivable systems (S4) offer a framework for technology that serves the interests of end-users and maintains human dignity, especially in crisis situations. The S4 principles are already evident in a number of technology projects, across research, design, build and deployment phases. Instead of high-risk, ad hoc, reactive digital solutions, crisis responders can pre-emptively share information, invest and work with existing technology design and development experts that reflect the S4 principles for efficient, effective solutions that enhance response capabilities both now and in future scenarios.
Nabben, K., Poblet, M. and Gardner-Stephen, P. (2020). “The Four Internets of COVID-19: the digital-political responses to COVID-19 and what this means for the post-crisis Internet”. In 2020 IEEE Global Humanitarian Technology Conference (GHTC) (pp. 1-8). IEEE. doi: 10.1109/GHTC46280.2020.9342859.
Abstract: Digital responses around the world to the COVID-19 pandemic highlight the acceleration in Internet governance trend towards authoritarianism in the digital-political responses to crisis and false trade-off decisions made by governments between privacy and public health. This paper investigates the digital-political responses to COVID-19 in the global contexts of ‘four internets’; the authoritarian Internet, the bourgeois European Internet, the commercial American Internet, and the propaganda Internet of state and non-state actors. We then explore the possible responses to the post-COVID-19 Internet, as well as the implications of geo-political Internet trends for crisis response groups and organisations.
Gardner-Stephen, P. and Nabben, K. 2020. “Capacity Maintenance during Global Disruptions: Security, resilience and incentives matter”. In 2020 IEEE Global Humanitarian Technology Conference (GHTC) (pp. 1-8). IEEE. doi: 10.1109/GHTC46280.2020.9342865.
Abstract: In an interconnected world, the challenge of maintaining interdependent systems during disasters and disruptive events, such as pandemics, bushfires, cyber-attacks and trade wars is imperative. The critical infrastructure capabilities to be sustained during disasters are many. COVID-19 has demonstrated how a public health threat can fracture the supply chains, including those that underpin digital systems, and degrade the capacity of software and hardware companies. Society must plan for such digital disruptions if it is to survive such shocks.We explore some of the reasons why this is necessary, including the issue of cascading failures, and examines how and in what form more resilient systems might take. This includes consideration of issues such as the need for incentives in order to drive and maintain adoption of resilient technologies, and how such incentives can be created as a natural property of well- conceived systems.We also briefly examine two initiatives that seek to solve some of the harder problems, including security, trustability, independence from energy and communications infrastructure, and the ability to sustain digital capabilities when digital supply chains fail. This remains an open area requiring attention, if society is to improve its resilience to significant shocks.
Poblet, M., Lane, A.M. and Nabben, K. (2020). “Measures to Fight the COVID-19 Pandemic. Australia.” Revista Catalana de Dret Públic, pp.276-288. doi: 10.2436/rcdp.i0.2020.3562.
Abstract: When Australia confirmed its first case of COVID-19 in the summer of 2020 (January 25), the blazes that had ravaged millions of hectares in the eastern states were not yet extinguished. Victoria had activated its first-ever State of Disaster and New South Wales (NSW) and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) had declared states of emergency. February started with the blocking of arrivals from mainland China (February 1) and continued with cancelled flight travel from South Korea, Iran and Italy. Cases plateaued in February, with less than 25 diagnosed, before the number multiplied in March. While remaining in an enviable position vis-à-vis the global pandemic outbreak, Australia would soon follow up many other countries in adopting public health measures to contain the spread of the new coronavirus, including internal and external border closures, lockdowns and, later on, curfews. These measures, unprecedented in peacetime, also raised serious challenges for civil liberties–notably freedom of movement and privacy–that remain contested and, ultimately, unresolved. Australia is a Federation in the common law tradition with a separation of powers between the Commonwealth government and six state governments along with two territory governments. This article, therefore, provides an overview of the measures that Australian public authorities at different levels have adopted to date to address the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic and outlines the main legal and ethical issues at stake. Section 2 outlines the legal basis underpinning these measures, both at the federal and state level. Section 3 covers the most relevant measures in terms of impact on fundamental rights. Section 4 reviews the key legal and ethical issues in the public debate and offers some directions for further exploration of these issues. Section 5 concludes by offering a compilation of legislation relevant to this period.